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ABSTRACT:  This paper examines how strategic alliances to create and use standards affect 
economic growth and development.  The explanation of the link from standards to economic growth and 
development is through the effects of standards on the incentives to perform industrial research and 
development (R&D).  We examine product standards, metrology traceable to national and international 
standards, and regulatory standards to address negative externalities.  The paper develops a theoretical 
explanation for the link from standards to growth, survey/interview-guides to gather information from 
industrial R&D experts about the explanation, and case-study evidence about the explanation.  We discuss 
the standard-setting process and explain it entails strategic alliances among firms and with government 
involvement.  Case studies of R&D projects in firms and in a national laboratory support the belief that 
standards implemented via strategic alliances leverage economic growth and development. 
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I.  Introduction 
This paper introduces a new approach to evaluating research and development (R&D) 
investments and applies the approach in 14 case studies to examine how strategic alliances to 
create and use standards affect economic growth and development.  The use of standards in 
industry entails strategic alliances of various forms, and we examine the effects of those alliances 
that promulgate product standards, metrology traceable to national and international standards, 
and regulatory standards to address negative externalities.  We describe the standard-setting 
process as a strategic alliance not only among firms but also with government involvement.   
Our explanation of the link from standards to economic growth and development is 
through the effects of standards on the incentives to perform industrial R&D.1  Our case studies 
juxtapose the opinions of industrial experts with the theory of investment in R&D to provide 
evidence that standards implemented via strategic alliances—firms receiving the support of 
standard-setting organizations (SSOs) and national laboratories, and also the alliance of 
government, labor, consumers, and firms to implement regulatory standards—do leverage 
economic growth and development.  Moreover, we explain and illustrate how net social value 
would be increased with additional public funding for a prominent public/private partnership to 
develop socially valuable technology for the automobile industry. 
The range of important product and measurement standards is wide, including standards 
for the physical characteristics of products (e.g., interoperability as with USB ports, or safety as 
with building materials) and services (e.g., communications as with protocols allowing exchange 
of data in high-speed communications networks, or security as with health records) and standards 
for measurement (e.g., thermocouple calibration for accurate measurement of temperature, 
traceable to a national or international standard). 
For product standards, firms depend on the capabilities of SSOs and other industry 
organizations that form strategic alliances among firms to ensure that each firm can compete 
successfully with its proprietary products that must be compatible with the products supplied by 
other firms.  The activities of SSOs often draw on expertise at government laboratories; hence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Standards, in contrast to nominally stronger intellectual property protection which increases R&D 
incentives while reducing the available pool of knowledge (Stiglitz, 2014), may increase incentives as 





the process of setting standards and using them in commerce entails a strategic alliance in a 
public/private partnership.2  
Support from government laboratories for the activities of SSOs and industry more 
generally often centers on measurement and calibration protocols (i.e. metrology) that are 
traceable to national and international standards maintained at a national laboratory.  Industrial 
users of traceable measurement standards have productivity-enhancing access to the capabilities 
of the national laboratory.  Development and application in industry of useful measurement 
standards often requires collaborative effort between industry and government laboratories to 
ensure that the measurement needs of industry are understood and the appropriate measurement 
standards and procedure for applying them and providing traceability are developed.3  
  In addition to product and measurement standards, there are also standards that address 
social concerns about effects of market processes when the costs are not faced fully by the 
participants in the market.  We examine a prominent example of such standards—the new CAFE 
standards4, announced August 28, 2012, mandating for the U.S. auto fleet an average fuel 
economy of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025.5  The CAFE standards address social concerns about 
energy and the environment.6   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Leyden and Link (1999) explain that in addition to providing technical support, government laboratories 
can serve the role of an honest broker to facilitate agreement among firms. 
3 See Tassey (1997), Link and Tassey (1987), and Link and Scott (2013). 
4 These new standards are the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) fleet average standards for 
2025. 
5 An important question is whether the new mandate has “teeth”—i.e., is accompanied with a credible 
threat of a sufficiently substantial penalty to “bite” when a company does not meet the standards.  The 
answer is yes, according to a knowledgeable senior Department of Transportation (DOT) official with 
whom we spoke.  Under the old CAFE standards, it was just a matter of fuel economy and everything was 
handled by DOT.  Then, as now, monetary penalties depended on an average miles per gallon short 
of meeting the standards.  There is a penalty if on average the corporation misses the target, and at times 
companies have opted to pay that fine and give customers the larger, more powerful (and hence less fuel 
efficient) cars they want (given relatively low gasoline prices).  Companies also shifted emphasis toward 
“light trucks” including “sports utility vehicles” (SUVs) for which the old CAFE standards were less 
demanding.  Now, with the new CAFE standards, EPA is on board, and given its authority under the 
Clean Air Act, if requirements are not met, a company could actually be forced to cease production.  With 
DOT alone, the company could produce when failing to meet standards, but would have to pay a penalty.  
With the new standards that are jointly enforced by DOT and EPA, companies that do not meet the 
standards cannot simply count on paying a fine and continuing operations.  However, as one expert (who 
has over many decades studied the automobile industry, industry quite generally, and government policies 
toward industry) told us, “A threat to shut down a whole production operation is simply not a credible 





Following the direction set by President Obama on May 21, 2010, NHTSA and EPA 
have issued joint Final Rules for Corporate Average Fuel Economy and Greenhouse 
Gas emissions regulations for model years 2017 and beyond, that will help address 
our country’s dependence on imported oil, save consumers money at the pump, and 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases that contribute to global climate change. 
(http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy)  
 
Development of the new CAFE standards involved collaboration between industry and 
government.  The standards followed the agreement, announced on July 29, 2011, between the 
Obama administration and automobile manufacturers, to increase mileage standards and cut 
greenhouse gas emissions for new cars.  The official press release on August 28, 2012 of the 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
emphasized the belief that the new standards will encourage investment in innovation and 
generate economic growth and development.  The announcement also emphasized that the new 
standards reflect the interaction of industry, consumer groups and the government.  The August 
28, 2012, press release “Obama Administration Finalizes Historic 54.5 mpg Fuel Efficiency 
Standards” stated (http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy):  
 
Achieving the new fuel efficiency standards will encourage innovation and 
investment in advanced technologies that increase our economic competitiveness and 
support high-quality domestic jobs in the auto industry. The final standards were 
developed by DOT’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and 
EPA following extensive engagement with automakers, the United Auto Workers, 
consumer groups, environmental and energy experts, states, and the public. Last year, 
13 major automakers, which together account for more than 90 percent of all vehicles 
sold in the United States, announced their support for the new standards. By aligning 
Federal and state requirements and providing manufacturers with long-term 
regulatory certainty and compliance flexibility, the standards encourage investments 
in clean, innovative technologies that will benefit families, promote U.S. leadership in 
the automotive sector, and curb pollution. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the simulation in this paper of our model of R&D investment and performance is one approach to 
understanding what the actual effects of the new standards will be. 
6 The evidence suggests that any “rebound effect” from drivers choosing to drive more miles (when the 
cost of driving each mile falls because of increased fuel efficiency) does not completely offset the 
reduction in fuel consumption achieved by the new technology (Greening, et al., 2000; Kotchen, 2012).  
The CAFE rulemaking information and documents are available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/fuel-economy.  
The site provides the key documents with detailed information about the final rule and the joint efforts of 





Crandall et al. (1986) and White (1982) provide landmark studies of regulatory standards 
applied to the automobile industry.  To have these important studies as a benchmark to which our 
approach and findings can be compared (and also to have an application of great interest), we use 
the automobile industry for our regulatory standards example. Crandall et al. (1986) examine 
three types of regulatory standards that have been applied to the automobile industry—safety 
standards, emissions standards, and fuel economy standards. The fuel economy standards they 
examine are the original CAFE standards introduced in 1975 when the initial fuel-efficiency goal 
was 27.5 miles per gallon by 1985, essentially half the new CAFE standard to be achieved by 
2025.   
Crandall et al. (1986, p. 4) observe: 
Obviously, each statute requiring federal regulation of the automobile is designed to 
force automobile manufacturers to provide some attribute—emissions control, safety, 
or fuel economy—to a greater degree than the market would dictate.  . . .  An obvious 
question to ask for each program is whether regulation has succeeded in reducing the 
undesired by-product or externality that it addresses. 
 
   
White (1982, pp. 8-10) provides a full discussion, in the context of the regulation of 
automobile emissions, of the economics of a negative externality and appropriate regulatory 
policy.  The political process has developed the direct, regulatory approach to controlling 
automobile emissions, but White (1982, pp. 92-97) explains the efficiency and flexibility of an 
effluent fee system to better align private decisions with the social welfare by internalizing 
external costs caused by driving automobiles.  In addition to the emissions externality, there is a 
pecuniary externality that can be addressed with regulation.  Scherer (1996, pp. 326-327) 
explains that consumers’ propensity to prefer larger cars, other things—in particular the price of 
gasoline—being the same,  
. . . poses problems for government officials who advocate energy conservation in a 
wealthy nation like the United States.  If consumer preferences are to be overridden, 
there must be some justification in a market failure. … [Consuming a large 
proportion] of the world’s petroleum products, the United States has a significant 
impact on the price of crude oil.  There is a pecuniary externality to U.S. consumption 
decisions. … [The CAFE standards] can be interpreted as a second-best solution to 
the crude oil price externality problem imposed in lieu of the first-best monopsony 






Fuel economy (measured in miles per gallon) and reduced emissions (measured in 
amounts of a substance emitted per mile) tend to move together, although not always in lockstep. 
For example, White (1982, pp. 60-64) describes the increased fuel consumption resulting from 
an early generation of emissions controls needed to meet the emissions standards in the late 
1970s.  The controls were estimated to increase fuel consumption by about 3 percent.  Earlier in 
the 1970s, before the mid-1970s introduction of oxidizing catalysts and unleaded gasoline, the 
controls (which had required engine modifications to reduce CO and HC emissions, combined 
with exhaust gas recirculation to control NOx) resulted in the fuel economy penalty being much 
higher.  White provides estimates of the reduction in fuel economy resulting from meeting the 
standards for various years throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.    
Although the CAFE standards are a government regulation, their success will require a 
collaborative strategic alliance of industry and government with forthright sharing of information 
about technological and organizational constraints.  Moreover, as discussed subsequently, a 
prominent U.S. public/private partnership is doing collaborative research to develop the 
materials and processes needed for lighter-weight and hence more fuel-efficient automobiles to 
meet the new standards. 
We gather information from industry and develop 14 case studies.7  Mansfield et al. 
(1977, p. 222) explain that to find the respondents for the 17 case studies in their seminal paper 
about the innovations from industrial research, many companies had to be contacted because the 
sensitive nature of information about R&D investments led to a low response rate.  Their 
resulting sample, they explain, could not be considered a random sample, although they had no 
reason to expect systematic bias that would affect their conclusions.  Similarly, we had to contact 
many potential respondents to obtain our 14 case studies, and while our sample cannot be 
considered random, we do not expect the views of our respondents to differ systematically from 
those of the set of potential respondents.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Our theoretical model develops the work in Scott (2009) and Scott and Scott (2014) to allow a version 
of the model that is normalized in two dimensions to facilitate discussion of the relationships in the model 
with industry respondents; our theoretical development allows the reconciliation of the two 
normalizations.  Our survey/interview-guide for product and measurement standards is in our working 
paper (Scott and Scott, 2013).  Our survey/interview-guide for the examination of the impacts of the 
CAFE standards is described herein and uses the same new theoretical developments with the 
normalizations of key relationships, and allows us to discuss with industrial respondents the impact on 





Our paper will explain how standards (product standards developed by SSOs and other 
industry associations and with the support of national laboratories, measurement standards 
traceable to a national laboratory and developed with collaboration of government and industry, 
and collaborative regulatory standards) can create incentives to increase industrial R&D and 
bring about economic growth and development.  All three types of standards entail collaboration 
of industry and government.  The survey approach we develop allows us to use the opinions of 
industrial R&D experts in case studies to calibrate the theoretical explanation of the R&D impact 
of standards and then simulate the effects of the standards on innovative activity.8  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents our model, and 
Section III explains the calibration of the model with our survey data.  Sections IV and V use our 
case studies to evaluate the economic impact of product and measurement standards supported 
by strategic partnerships connecting firms, SSOs, and public laboratories.  Section VI uses the 
example of the new CAFE standards to illustrate the impact of regulatory standards.  Section VII 
concludes with discussion of the importance of strategic partnerships for effective standards that 
promote growth and development and also with discussion of our approach to evaluating the 
impacts of standards. 
II. The Model 
Our formal model develops the model in Scott (2009) and Scott and Scott (2014) in 
appropriate ways to allow its simulation using information gathered from respondents in 
industry. 
At the center of the model is an index x  of the relative quality of a company’s 
technology (relative to the technology of its competition in the post-innovation market).  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In addition to illustrating the effects of standards on respondents’ R&D investment and their expected 
net benefits from that investment, the examples of economic growth and development can be quite direct 
and occur rapidly.  For example, one respondent describes the CAFE-standards-induced R&D to develop 
a lower-cost way to produce carbon fiber for automobile parts that “light-weight” cars and improve their 
fuel efficiency.  The respondent’s success—just two years from the agreement between the industry and 
the administration and a year after the announcement of the new standards—had won a contract to 
provide carbon-fiber parts for the next model of an expensive, relatively low production volume, high-
performance car.  The new contract supported the opening of a new plant to produce the contracted 
components.  The ultimate goal of such CAFE-standards-induced R&D is to make cost-effective the use 
of new light-weight materials in high-volume mass-produced vehicles.  As the R&D investments yield 
new sources of light-weighting materials and lower-cost ways of producing the final products, economic 





index is normalized so that 100=x corresponds to a situation where the quality of the respondent 
company’s technology is equal to that of its most successful rival.  Uncertainty of the technical 
success of both the respondent’s and rivals’ research efforts is reflected by the distribution over 
values of x . 
The probability density function ( )xf depends on the respondent’s R&D effort iR and the 
research effort of rivals, denoted by iR− .  More research effort for a firm will shift its distribution 
rightward over higher values for x ; more research effort by the firm’s rivals will shift its 
distribution leftward over lower values for x .   
In the post-innovation market, the higher the responding firm’s relative quality, the more 
competitive it is and the higher the value—the present value of the stream of future profits in the 
post-innovation market— )(xV .  We denote the present expected value of the innovation’s future 
profits, which is ( ) ( )dxRxfxV i;∫ , by )( iRG . 
The firm chooses its research effort to maximize expected net present value—the present 
expected value of profits in the post-innovation market net of the cost of research effort, iwR , 
where w is the unit cost of research effort:9 
( ) ( ) ( )( )∫ −≡− iiiiR wRdxRxfxVwRRGi ;max   
Net present value, NPV, is maximized when the marginal cost of R&D equals the 
marginal expected value of future profits: idRdGw = .  This first-order condition is depicted in 
Figure 1 by the diagram showing the iso-NPV line tangent to the expected value function at the 
optimal level of R&D effort. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In our case studies, we calibrate our model using survey data and then use the calibrated 
model to describe the R&D impacts of standards in innovative industries. 
 
III. Calibrating the Model with Survey Data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In a theory setting, w could be normalized at 1, effectively omitting it from the model, as it is in Scott 
(2009).  When using survey data to calibrate the model, w is used to reconcile two normalizations—of 
R&D effort and the value expected in the post-innovation market—that are necessary to avoid questions 





Our survey begins by asking the responding firm for a description of its research and the 
standards used—standards for the attributes of products and services as well as standards for 
measurement.10  In the case study that we present in detail to illustrate and explain our approach, 
the respondent, a senior R&D manager and researcher with one of the world’s preeminent 
research-intensive firms reports: 
[The company] works in a huge variety of industrial research areas.  The following 
answers to the survey are based on my small portion of [the company’s] R&D.  My 
area of industrial research is related to the supply of new and innovative materials for 
the manufacture of printed wiring boards.  This includes flexible copper clad laminate 
substrates, coverlay and bondply materials, photoimageing materials, and high 
performance insulating films. 
 
The respondent explains the technology standards most relevant to the company’s 
research as follows. 
Technology standards that are most relevant to our research efforts are developed by 
industry associations such as IPC Association Connecting Electronic Industries, 
SMTA (Surface Mount Technology Association), IEEE and others related to 
electronics manufacturing.  These standards cover a variety of areas including printed 
wiring board materials, printed wiring board manufacturing, assembly and quality. 
 
The company uses measurement standards entailed in high frequency signal test methods 
for printed wiring boards and the standards used to calibrate precision instruments. The firm is 
engaged in creating new and improved photoimageable photoresists for creating printed wiring 
board circuitry, new and improved flexible laminates for the printed wiring board industry, and 
new and improved polyimide films.  The measurement standards in this example include 
standards embodied in infrastructure technologies developed through combining efforts of 
industry and federal laboratories, specifically at the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST).  The respondent reports that for its research investments it participates in 
industry associations such as IPC—Association Connecting Electronic Industries—where its 
researchers can network with NIST personnel, and it uses publicly available high-frequency 
signal test methods for printed wiring boards and measurement standards to which test 
equipment may be calibrated with the measurements traceable to NIST. 
To begin our calibration of the model, we ask the respondent to consider a hypothetical 
typical R&D project in the area of industrial research as just described and to estimate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





expected value of x (as described in Section II) and the probability of x  being at least 25 percent 
greater than expected.  The respondent for the example used for our illustration answered that the 
expected value of x  was 125 and the probability of x  being at least 25 percent greater than 
expected was 0.075.  For simplicity we assume a normal distribution for x , and for the normal 
distribution with expected value x  we can then solve for the standard deviation for the 
distribution.11  The standard deviation is 21.7.12  Thus, the standard deviation is 17.4% of the 
mean, and for our simulations as R changes and shifts the distribution, we maintain the standard 
deviation at 17.4% of the mean. 
R&D effort is normalized so that 100=iR  corresponds to the level of effort actually 
chosen by the respondent; with that effort, from the response above, the expected value of x  is 
125.  Continuing our calibration of the model, we next ask the respondent for the expected value 
of x  if the company’s research effort were to vary up or down while the R&D effort of rival 
companies did not change.  In this example, the respondent reported that if its R&D effort were 
to decrease by 25 percent while the R&D effort of rival companies did not change, the expected 
value of x  would be 90.  On the up side, the estimate was that at 125% of its actual R&D with 
rivals R&D held constant, the expected value of x  would be 135, would be 145 at 150% of 
actual R&D, and would be 150 at 200% of actual R&D.  Thus, for this respondent we have the 
pairs for ( )xE , the expected value of x , and for iR : (90, 75), (125, 100), (135, 125), (145, 150), 
and (150, 200). 
We have assumed that )(xf  is normal and that its mean has a simple functional 
relationship to iR , namely ∫ += dRcdxRxxf ii )log();( , where the parameters c  and d  are 
chosen with ordinary least squares to fit the responses to the questions about the pairs for )(xE  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Alternatively, because the gamma distribution is also determined by two parameters, we can get similar 
results assuming that distribution.  Although the gamma distribution has the intuitive appeal of its skewed 
shape (that as it shifts rightward becomes more like a normal distribution) and a domain of the positive 
numbers, we use the more familiar normal distribution.  In fact, for the parameterizations implied by the 
respondents’ answers, typically the gamma distribution has approached an approximately normal 
distribution for relative quality over the positive numbers and appears symmetrically bell-shaped and with 
very small probability, often essentially zero, over the research outcomes with very poor relative 
performance. 
12 We solve for the standard deviation such that the integral of the distribution from 156.25 (which is 1.25 





and for iR .
13  For this respondent, 158)log(6.59)( −= iRxE , with the standard deviation of the 
distribution at 17.4 percent of its mean.14 
We next asked about the relative differences, for different values of x , in the present 
value of the future stream of profits from innovation from the R&D.  We asked the respondent to 
think about the value of R&D results as follows:  
Imagine an index of the value to your company—the present value to your company 
of the stream of future profits in the post-innovation market available to provide a 
return on the R&D investment—associated with a given index of R&D quality.  
Normalize this value index so that the value of equaling the quality of the best R&D 
outcome among rival companies is 100 (i.e., the value index is 100 when the R&D 
quality index, considered above, is 100).  A value index of 125 would describe a 
situation where the expected profit stream has a present value 25% higher than the 
profit stream that would be expected if your company’s R&D index was 100. 
 
Thus, the value )(xV  associated with equaling the quality of the state-of-the-art 
technology is normalized at 100; i.e., 100)100( =V .  We then asked the respondent for an 
estimate of what the value index would be if the company’s R&D quality index were 110, if the 
quality index were 125, and if the quality index were 150.  In the example we are using, the 
respondent estimated that the value of x  would be 105 given x  equal 110, 110 given x  equal 
125, and 120 given x  equal 150.  Thus, for the example, we have ( )xV  and x  pairs of (100, 
100), (105, 110), (110, 125), and (120, 150). 
To continue our calibration of the model, we assume the value function has the simple 
functional form )log()( xbaxV +=  if 0>x , and 0)( =xV  if 0≤x  (because the company will 
in such cases of extraordinarily bad outcomes not commercialize the results of R&D).15  Also, 
we assume the value function passes through the point (100, 100). Thus, 
))100log()(log(100)( −=− xbxV .  The parameter b  is then chosen to fit the responses for the 
( ) 100−xV  and )100/log(x  pairs.  Thus, for this example, we use ordinary least squares with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Throughout, we use log to denote the natural logarithm, sometimes denoted ln.  We have chosen the 
simple functional form to minimize the number of parameters estimated. 
14 Adjusted R2 = 0.844, F(1, 3) = 22.56, and the probability of a larger F = 0.018. 
15 Our simulation results are insensitive to a variety of alternative assumptions about the value for the 
extraordinarily poor research outcomes because the survey responses imply that the probability of such 





pairs ))5.1log(,20()),25.1log(,10()),1.1log(,5( .  The regression provides the estimate of b , and 
then )100log(100 ba −= . We have 123)log(4.48)( −= xxV .16   
Using the estimated functions for )(xV  and )(xE , and keeping the standard deviation of 
the distribution for x  at 17.4% of the mean as the distribution is shifted by changes in iR , we 
can compute ( ) ( ) ( )dxRxfxVRG ii ;∫=  and the slope of ( )iRG  at 100=iR .  In this particular 
case, the slope at 100=iR  is found to be 0.248. 
Therefore, profit-maximization implies the cost per unit of R&D investment is 0.248.  
This gives us the value for 𝑤 that reconciles the normalizations of )100(V and iR ; 248.0=w  
will remain constant as the functions for )(xV  and )(xE shift in the counterfactual scenarios we 
examine.17  Moreover, present expected innovation value can now be expressed as a multiple of 
research expenditure, a figure that typically is available or can be reasonably estimated.  In this 
example, the net present value for the hypothetical project, ** iwRG − , is 3.3 times the present 
value of the R&D costs, *iwR .
18  Since 𝐺 is some fraction of the total expected social value, 
including spillovers, generated by the firm’s R&D effort, it is possible to express that social 
value also in dollars. 
 
IV. The Importance of Standard-Setting Organizations and Public Support   
With a sufficiently large sample of firms, in industries with different market structures 
and belonging to different SSOs, there is much useful insight to be gleaned from the preceding 
information alone.  However, we want to address the impacts on R&D investment and 
performance of public infrastructure technology for measurement standards and also SSOs and 
other industry associations involved with standards.  We ask about hypothetical, counterfactual 
situations in which first the government labs and their support for infrastructure technology are 
absent from the standard-setting activities.  We then ask about the counterfactual situation where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Adjusted R2 = 0.997, F(1,2) = 1126, and the probability of a larger F = 0.0009. 
17 See the Appendix for details. 
18 499.106* =G and )100)(248.0(* =iwR .  Our results are not very sensitive to the assumption of 
normal distribution with the standard deviation a constant fraction of the mean.  We reach very 
similar results by ignoring the distribution altogether, supposing that the company maximizes not 





SSOs and other industry associations supporting standards activities are absent.  The firm 
estimates how );( Rxf  and )(xV  could be expected to change in these counterfactual cases.  
The First Counterfactual:  The Absence of Standards Support from Public 
Laboratories.  For the first counterfactual, we ask the respondent whether NIST or other public 
labs have played a significant role in the development of technology standards most relevant to 
the company’s research efforts in the area of research relevant for the hypothetical project being 
discussed.  The respondent for the particular case study being described here reports:  
Volunteers from NIST and other labs . . . participate as either leaders or participants 
on many of the standards development committees and task groups.  As such, they 
bring discipline to these efforts by ensuring that any round robin testing is done in a 
quality manner as well as helping to ensure that the standards that are developed are 
done in a manner that uses science as a basis. 
 
We then ask the respondent: 
. . . to imagine a counterfactual situation without the involvement of NIST or other 
public labs in the standard-setting process.  Try to imagine this situation, given the 
best response of your company, rival companies, and relevant industry organizations 
in the absence of this public support. 
 
In our example, the respondent estimated that in the counterfactual case the R&D effort 
needed to achieve a given (expected) quality index would be 25 percent higher:  
].158)25.1log(6.59[)log(6.59158)25.1/log(6.59);()( +−=−== ∫ iii RRdxRxxfxE  
This implies a leftward shift in the distribution and a rightward shift in the )( iRG function.  
Facing a more difficult R&D problem, the optimal level of R&D effort increases and net present 
value falls, as depicted in Figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The effect on the relation between R&D and quality is not the entire story.  For our 
illustrative example, the respondent reports that the value in the post-innovation market would 
also be 10 percent lower in the counterfactual case because of what the standards are doing for 
production and commercialization. Thus, ]123)log(4.48)[90.0()( −= xxV .  This has the effect of 
reducing optimal R&D effort and reducing NPV.  If the distribution-shifting effect and the value-
reducing effect on optimal R&D effort offset exactly, then these NPV-reducing effects reinforce 





In the present case, the value-reducing effect is offset slightly by the distribution-shifting effect, 
and the amount of R&D investment in the counterfactual case for the hypothetical project 
increases by 1.0 percent to 101.0 percent of the effort when the public support for standards 
activities is present.  In the actual case, ** iwRG − , is 3.3 times the present value of the R&D 
costs, *iwR .  For the counterfactual case without the support of national laboratories, the ratio of 
the net present value, ** iwRG − , to the present value of the R&D costs, 
*
iwR , is 2.6.   
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
We described above for the benchmark case how to turn 𝐺 into a dollar amount, and we 
can do the same thing in the counterfactual case—using the model and the answers to a few 
questions, we can estimate that the number is a certain percent of actual R&D expenditure, and 
then we can look at what the firm spends on R&D in a typical year.  As in the benchmark case, 
we would want to apply an appropriate multiplier to the value the firm captures in order to get 
the social value, including spillovers.  The difference between the social value in each case 
provides an estimate of the social value that is attributable to the government lab’s role in 
standard-setting—looking just at this one firm and any spillovers from this firm’s activity.19   
The Second Counterfactual: The Absence of Standards Support from SSOs and 
Industry Associations.  For the second counterfactual, we ask the respondent whether SSOs or 
industry associations played a significant role in the development of technology standards most 
relevant to the company’s research efforts being discussed. The respondent for the illustrative 
case study answers yes and reports:  
The standards developed by SSOs create a framework within which we do our R&D 
in that many of the needed physical properties are identified and the range of 
acceptable levels is also specified.  Without this information, it would be much more 
difficult to develop products that would be useful to a wide range of companies.  This 
is because the effort of obtaining “Voice of the Customer” from each customer would 
be very difficult.  In addition, the standards help to provide general agreement on how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 When there is a difference, as there is in the present case being used for illustration, in private R&D 
effort between the actual and counterfactual cases, either because of additional effort in the counterfactual 
case to replicate the lab’s contribution or because of complementarities between public and private 
research crowding-in additional private investment in the actual case, then that would also enter into the 
calculation.  For example, additional private investment in the actual case would need to be subtracted 





the physical properties should be measured, thus avoiding miscommunication 
between the developer . . . and the customer. 
 
Next we ask the respondent: 
. . . to imagine a counterfactual situation without the involvement of SSOs and 
industry associations in the standard-setting process.  Try to imagine this situation, 
given the best response of your company and rival companies in the absence of SSOs 
and industry associations. 
 
In this counterfactual situation without SSOs and industry associations, the respondent 
reports that the R&D effort required to achieve a given R&D quality index would increase by 
50%.  Moreover, the value of R&D outcomes would decrease by 30% in the absence of the SSOs 
and industry associations.  
In this counterfactual, without the SSOs and industry associations to support the 
standards work, the net present value for our respondent’s hypothetical research project falls to 
about half of its value given the SSOs and industry associations.20 The net result of the 
distribution-shifting and value-shifting effects on R&D investment is to decrease the investment 
to 93% of what it would be with the SSOs and industry associations. 
Sample Averages:  Comparisons of Impacts for the Counterfactual Scenarios.   
Future research might obtain the cooperation of one or more SSOs or industry associations for a 
large sample study based on the views of their members’ R&D managers and researchers;  Chiao 
et al. (2007) provide a list of such organizations.   Here we have case studies of R&D projects 
described by respondents (some identified during earlier evaluation projects reviewed in Link 
and Scott (2013)), who responded to our request for their opinions. In addition to the responses 
used above for the step-by-step illustration of the model, we had an additional six sets of 
responses to the survey about product and measurement standards.21   
Our respondents included companies working with standards in a variety of ways.  
Among the respondents were those who described their work as follows, beginning with the 
description paraphrased from the respondent who provided the foregoing illustrative example. 
• Research and product development related to the supply of new and innovative materials for 
the manufacture of printed wiring boards including flexible copper clad laminate substrates, 
coverlay and bondply materials, photoimageing materials, and high performance insulating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  (65.044 –( 0.248)(93))/(106.499 –(0.248)(100)) = 0.51. 
21 The correspondence with the respondents and interviews occurred in October and November of 2012 





films:  Technology standards that are most relevant to the research efforts are developed by 
industry associations such as IPC Association Connecting Electronic Industries, SMTA (Surface 
Mount Technology Association), IEEE and others related to electronics manufacturing.  These 
standards cover a variety of areas including printed wiring board materials, printed wiring board 
manufacturing, assembly and quality.  Publicly provided infrastructure technologies used in this 
area of industrial research include high frequency signal test methods for printed wiring boards, 
creation of standards to which the test equipment may be calibrated and participation in industry 
associations such as IPC, Association Connecting Electronic Industries, where the researchers 
can network with NIST personnel on an individual basis. 
 
• Research and product development for mobile devices with standards being an integral part of 
both the products and the research to develop them—research about wireless technologies and 
standards—wide-area network, local area Wi-Fi, and even more local with Bluetooth and Near 
Field:  The research and product development enables production by mobile device 
manufacturers.  Important are interconnect standards, standards for wiring within devices, and 
standards-related R&D to enable transmission and reception of images from cameras to 
computer/device displays.  Very fast links and huge amounts of data are exchanged.  There is 
R&D about sensors, for example for ambient light, for microphones, for GPS, for gyroscopes—
all involve standardized interfaces.  The R&D is about developing capabilities for moving large 
amounts of data, exchanging it, and storing it in devices. 
 
• Research and product development for safe electronics and better design of Human Machine 
Interface (HMI) products that improve performance and reduce costs for machine control and 
process measurement applications, for example in oil and gas exploration:  A HMI is in general a 
computer and display integrated in a rugged enclosure, usually with a touchscreen interface for 
operator interaction but sometimes serving solely as an information terminal.  Typically the 
HMIs are connected to a higher level system such as a server on a drilling platform or an array of 
sensors in the case of process measurement.  HMIs in such an environment must survive extreme 
environmental exposure to hot and cold temperatures, and must be useable in both daytime and 
nighttime conditions.  They must meet very rigid international certification standards for 
explosive atmosphere safety because of the risk of volatile gasses being present in the 
environments.  Important for the research and product development are standards regarding 
product attributes for explosive environments, product interfaces including Ethernet, fiber optic, 
and USB, and measurement standards for displays, for product environmental testing and 
product development processes. 
 
• Research and product development for computer applications in medical imaging, including 
image display techniques and display device calibration:  Important for the research and product 
development are CIE standards for measurement of luminance and chromaticity, NIST standards 
for calibration of luminance and color measuring devices, DICOM standards administered by 
NEMA for image storage and transmission and perceptual linearization calibration, and VESA 
display metrology standards. 
 
• Compliance testing and R&D for developing test facilities for the testing of product compliance 
to new standards:  Products are tested for compliance to energy efficiency, electrical safety, and 





testing infrastructure and test methods to ensure that outcomes of testing will prove a product 
complies or fails to comply with national and international standards.  Important are standards 
for electrical safety in telecommunications, home entertainment equipment, and power supplies, 
and for energy efficiency in lighting, IT, power supplies, and home entertainment equipment. 
 
The respondents report that they work with standards written by committees that include 
industry, laboratory test facilities, government representatives, industry and trade associations, 
SSOs, and other interested parties.  They work with national laboratories such as NIST and with 
the support of SSOs and trade associations and private labs. 
For each scenario, we asked each respondent for an approximation of the proportion of 
the typical research project’s total value that would not be captured by the company but would 
spill over to other firms (as producer surplus) and customers (as consumer surplus).  These 
approximations of spillovers are used for estimating the social value of the R&D projects. 
Table 1 provides the averages of key metrics for the actual scenario for the seven 
respondents who discussed product and measurement standards.  The seven observations in 
Table 1 represent different types of firms:  large and diversified (three observations), large and 
focused (one observation), medium-sized with some diversification (one observation), and small 
with R&D that is fairly focused (two observations).   
 
Table 1 ABOUT HERE 
     
In five of the seven cases summarized in Table 1, the respondent also provided the 
description of the counterfactual scenario without the support of public laboratories.  Table 2 
provides the averages for the changes in the key metrics for the counterfactual case where the 
companies do not have the public laboratory support for their use of standards.  R&D investment 
falls by 8.3 percent, the private benefit-to-cost ratio falls by 13.8 percent, and the social benefit-
to-private-cost ratio falls by 32.5 percent.  
 
Table 2 ABOUT HERE 
     
In five of the seven cases summarized in Table 1, the respondent provided the 
information about the counterfactual scenario without the support of SSOs or industry 





counterfactual case where the companies do not have the support of SSOs and industry 
organizations.  In that counterfactual, R&D investment falls by 34.5 percent, the private benefit-
to-cost ratio falls by 19.1 percent, and the social benefit-to-private-cost ratio falls by 59.1 
percent.   
 
Table 3 ABOUT HERE 
     
V.  Overview of the Effects of Standards Enabled by SSOs and Public Laboratories  
There are multiple effects on R&D incentives as intellectual property (IP) protection is 
strengthened or weakened by the use of standards.  One effect can be through a change in the 
proportion of the value of innovative investment that is captured by rivals—that is, not 
appropriated by the innovator.  We elicit respondents’ assessment of this proportion in both the 
public lab and SSO scenarios, in both the actual and counterfactual situations.  But while each 
firm fails to capture some of the value that it creates, for that very reason each will benefit from 
the value created by its rivals’ research projects.  Comparing our counterfactual cases with the 
actual situation, we can observe the net effects of the spillovers received and the spillovers lost. 
Note that standards enabled by SSOs and public labs provide value as a public good, and 
so their effect on the amount of IP protection is different from policy interventions that change 
the rules governing IP protection. Such rules changes, which in contrast to standards do not add 
value in the form of a public-good asset as they strengthen or weaken the amount of IP 
protection, imply a tradeoff between the incentive for innovative effort and the size of the pool of 
knowledge on which this effort draws (Stiglitz, 2014).  Standards, while also affecting the 
strength of IP protection, may at least partially escape this tradeoff. Standards could conceivably 
increase incentives for innovative investment while expanding the relevant pool of knowledge 
and making it more accessible.  
In our model, the effect of standards on the appropriability of the value of innovative 
investments operates through two channels: Standards affect the value of relative performance 
and the probability distribution over relative performance.  These effects can, perhaps somewhat 
subtly, be likened to changes in IP protection, although they comprise a more complicated set of 
relations than simply the strength of a patent measured in various ways (such as the length of 





in an innovation’s profit margin because of the patent, etc.).  Introducing standards on the one 
hand can make the proprietary products of a company more valuable and so in the abstract 
strengthen IP protection—in the sense of increasing the private value of IP.  The standards can 
increase the private value of any given amount of IP at any given level of nominal IP protection 
(conferred by patent regulations and other relevant legal institutions), and can conceivably do so 
in a way that is not zero sum even among rival firms, because the standards themselves are 
valuable as public-good assets.  On the other hand, because the standards allow more companies 
to compete with their proprietary products, standards can also weaken IP protection—in the 
sense of decreasing the private value of IP. Specifically, by intensifying competition, standards 
could reduce the value that a given firm is able to appropriate from its IP—albeit while 
increasing the social value of the IP.  Thus, standards both strengthen and weaken IP protection, 
and our method allows us to see on balance the overall effect on innovative investment and 
performance.  
Support for standards, provided by public laboratories and SSOs and industry 
associations, has a large impact on the private and social value of industrial research.  The 
finding is consistent with what our respondents say in their prose descriptions of the importance 
of the support they receive from public laboratories and SSOs and industry associations.  One 
respondent wrote: “Without efforts of [the SSOs and industry associations] with NIST support, 
there would be total anarchy and chaos.  SSOs level the playing field for researchers large and 
small.” Another respondent stated that without support for standards provided by SSOs and 
industry associations: 
Manufacturers will try to separate themselves from others by implementing non-
standardized processes and then let the market choose the winner.  It is hard to learn 
if you are not part of a group that has a common goal. 
 
Responding to the question: “Have SSOs or industry associations played a significant 
role in the development of technology standards most relevant to your company’s research 
efforts?” another respondent wrote: 
Our entire marketplace relies on industry standards . . . .  Because of the standards, 
we all work to the same relatively level playing field.  Without those standards, all 
customers would have unique and often conflicting requirements making standard 
product development for this market a nightmare.  We also rely heavily on business 
process standards such as ISO-9001:2000 and AS-9100 to both better our own 





qualified suppliers.  Without this framework, more arbitrary and less objective 
methods might be employed to qualify suppliers leading to more uncertainty and 
chaos in the marketplace. 
 
Our findings are also consistent with our respondents’ views that, without standards 
supported by public laboratories and by SSOs and industry associations, there would be a 
dramatic decline in the quality of the products and services they create.  Commenting about the 
decline in the expected quality of the state-of-the-art in the counterfactual case without SSOs and 
industry associations, one respondent observed: 
. . . without performance standards, development efforts would be customer specific 
and more random yielding much lower ROI, hence much lower total investment.  
Innovation would be harder to find because the prevailing problems would be harder 
to identify.  Less effort combined with less consensus on the problems to be solved 
would yield much lower quality and innovation of solutions. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the respondents’ statements about the decline in quality that would 
result without SSO and national laboratory support for standards and their use. 
 
Table 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
VI.  Regulatory Standards to Change the Direction and Rate of Technological Change:  
The Case of Fuel Efficiency 
Public policy to promote innovation aimed at reducing pollution may be especially 
desirable, because the underinvestment in new technology is likely to be greater when the 
principal value of the new technology is to reduce a negative externality and the technology is 
therefore likely to be underappreciated in the market (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins, 2005). If the 
price drivers pay at the pump does not reflect the full social cost of that gasoline, their 
willingness to pay for new technology that improves a vehicle’s fuel efficiency will not reflect 
the social value of having that technology. It is an open question whether fuel efficiency 
standards are an effective policy in this context.  
To analyze the impact of the new CAFE standards on automotive R&D investment, we 
use an interview-guide/survey with essentially the same questions about the probability 
distribution for relative outcomes from a firm’s R&D and the value of those outcomes.  Also, we 





interest.  For the analysis of the impact of the new CAFE standards, the counterfactual scenario 
is the situation without the new regulations. 
Crandall et al. (1986, p. 117) found that the original CAFE regulations did not have much 
impact because “. . .the Arab oil embargo and the subsequent rise in the real price of motor fuel 
would surely have induced a response from the automobile companies and consumers in the 
absence of fuel economy regulation.  Automobiles would be much more fuel efficient today even 
if the government had not chosen to regulate fuel efficiency.”  Crandall et al. introduce 
methodology to estimate the impact of regulation apart from the improved fuel efficiency as the 
market responded to higher gasoline prices, and conclude (Crandall et al., 1986, p. 135):  
“Overall, it appears that the improvement in fuel economy for the industry was very close to 
what would have been expected without the CAFE standards.”  White’s seminal study (1982) 
found that while the direct regulation of the emissions from vehicles reduced air pollution, the 
design of the emissions regulation was not optimal and caused costs that could have been 
avoided, a conclusion forcefully echoed by Crandall et al. (1986, pp. 115-116).    
The analyses of Crandall et al. (1986) and White (1982) were retrospective; they 
examined the history that unfolded after the original CAFE and emissions regulations.  In 
contrast, we use our model to project the impact of the new CAFE 2025 regulations; thus the 
analysis here is prospective rather than retrospective.  We ask automobile-industry R&D 
managers about parameters of the R&D investment model and then simulate what is expected to 
happen. Our findings project outcomes that inform both the understanding of the impacts of the 
new regulatory standards and any future modifications to those standards.  The understanding 
shows the importance of strategic partnerships to enable fuel-efficiency objectives of public 
policy while promoting economic growth and development. 
The announcement of the new CAFE standards prompted considerable thought and 
discussion from the automotive industry.  Automotive Engineering International, the trade 
journal for the Society of Automotive Engineers, published several articles (Ashley, 2012; 
Brooke, 2012; Costlow, 2012) about how the industry would respond to the new standards.  The 
articles quoted automobile industry experts’ opinions about the response, and we wrote to the 
quoted experts and requested their help with our research.  We also contacted the R&D 
organizations of the major automobile manufacturers with the same request.  Eight of the 





responding to the survey questions and talking with us about the anticipated R&D-investment 
impact of the new CAFE standards.22 
As explained in the introduction, the discussion of Mansfield et al. (1977, p. 222) about 
the limitations of samples of respondents willing to discuss industrial R&D projects is directly 
relevant, so we could not expect to get a large sample.  Moreover, the sample obtained cannot be 
considered random, although we have no reason to think that our sample is biased in ways that 
would cause us to find effects for the new CAFE standards that would differ from what we 
would find with a larger sample.  Our eight respondents came from four different parts of the 
automotive supply chain.  Two of the responses are from senior R&D managers explicitly stating 
that they are responding on behalf of the companies’ directors for R&D (to whom we had 
written) at two of the world’s largest automakers.  Two of the responses are from R&D managers 
(one of these also the Chief Technical Officer) for companies supplying major components and 
materials to the automobile manufacturers.  Another two responses are from R&D experts from 
automotive consulting and engineering research companies.23  Finally, two respondents were 
R&D managers for a major collaborative R&D project bringing together companies from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Potential respondents were contacted and survey responses and interviews and follow-up discussions 
with the respondents were conducted during the period from February through August of 2013. 
23	  For the consulting firms, where appropriate such as with questions about the value of the research to the 
companies working with the research firm to accomplish an R&D project, the respondents were asked to 
respond to the questions about the research projects from the standpoint of the companies doing the 
research with the consulting firm.  So, for the questions about private value, the respondents were asked 
to “[i]magine an index of the value to companies using the research with which [company name] is 
involved (the present value of the stream of future profits in the post-innovation market, available to 
provide a return on R&D investment).”  Then, subsequently, for the counterfactual, they were asked: 
“How would the value to companies using the research with which [company name] is involved . . . of a 
given R&D quality index change?”  For the questions about spillovers from R&D activity used to get 
from private to social value, for the consulting firms the survey stated:  “Typically, a company will not 
capture all of the value of its R&D outcomes. Other companies often benefit by observing the technology 
and applying what they learn to their own R&D efforts. Consumers using products embodying the new 
technology will receive benefits greater than the price they pay because competition keeps price below 
what they would be willing to pay.  Because the benefit from R&D in part spills over to consumers and 
other producers (and in the case of R&D aimed at improving fuel economy and reducing emissions also 
spills over to others beyond those using the technology, but here we focus on consumers and producers 
that actually use the technology), the value captured by successful innovators is likely to be less than the 
total social value created.  As a rough estimate, what percentage of the total social value (for users of the 
technology) of the R&D outcomes of the research with which [company name] is involved can the 
companies developing the research with [company name] expect to capture? That is, what percentage of 





throughout the automotive supply chain and the scientists and engineers and physical laboratory 
resources of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).24  
In their descriptive statements about their organization’s R&D, the respondents indicated 
that the research is applicable to internal combustion vehicles, hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in 
hybrid vehicles, and all-electric vehicles.  Five of the eight respondents reported that applications 
of the R&D in which they are actively involved are primarily anticipated for all four of those 
categories.25 One of the eight respondents said that the company’s research was primarily 
applicable to internal combustion and hybrid electric vehicles, and secondarily applicable to 
plug-in hybrid and all-electric vehicles.  One respondent said the company’s research was 
primarily applicable to hybrid electric, plug-in hybrid, and all-electric vehicles and secondarily 
applicable to internal combustion vehicles.  One respondent reported that the company’s research 
was primarily applicable to internal combustion vehicles and secondarily applicable to hybrid 
electric, plug-in hybrid, and all-electric vehicles.  
For the case studies of the six automotive industry companies, we applied the same 
method explained in Sections II, III, and IV.   Table 5 shows the averages of private benefit-to-
cost ratios, private net present value-to-cost ratios, and the ratios of social value to private costs.  
On average, private net present values of CAFE-related R&D investments are positive—the 
private benefit-to-cost ratios exceed 1.0.  Social benefit-to-cost ratios are much higher. 
 
Table 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
However, when we examine the changes in the evaluation metrics for the counterfactual 
scenario of no new CAFE standards as compared to the situation with the new 2025 standards, 
we find a dramatic difference from what we saw in Section IV when comparing the 
counterfactual and actual situations for measurement and product standards.  SSOs and public 
laboratories were seen by industry as supportive, and we found that without such support, the 
performance of industrial R&D deteriorated.  However, our discussions with industrial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Again, for the collaborative project at ORNL, when appropriate such as with questions about the 
private value of the research, the respondents were asked to respond from the standpoint of the firms 
collaborating in the project.  For example, see the material below about the spillovers question in the 
discussion of the ORNL project.  
25 These four categories were listed in our survey/interview guide.  It also had a category for “other” 





respondents reveal that from industry’s perspective, the new CAFE standards are redirecting 
R&D efforts and some respondents believe that there would be greater value for industrial R&D 
efforts in the absence of the new standards.  Those respondents believe that market forces would 
cause the automobile industry to respond to the demands of consumers and that the value of 
R&D directed at satisfying those demands would far exceed the value of the R&D that is 
necessitated for the industry to satisfy the new 2025 CAFE mandates.26 
Simulating the parameterized model for the six case studies finds that for only one of the 
six companies is the social benefit-to-cost ratio for its CAFE-related R&D expected to be greater 
given the new CAFE 2025 mandates than without them.  The private value of that company’s 
R&D is also greater with the new standards.  That one company is one that is ahead of the curve 
and has recently developed new process technology allowing it to secure sufficient orders to be 
able to build new production facilities in 2013 for its innovation of components that “light-
weight” automobiles and therefore improve their fuel-efficiency.  The current R&D of that 
company is aimed at further improving process technology and reducing further the cost of 
producing its “light-weighting” innovative products.  For two of the respondents, the CAFE 2025 
mandates have not changed the fuel-efficiency-related R&D they do—in one case because the 
company was committed to improving its fuel-efficiency-enhancing technology even without the 
new standards and in the other case because the majority of the company’s sales are outside the 
U.S.  For the remaining three companies, the responses to our questions imply that both the 
private value of their R&D and its social value would be greater without the new standards.  For 
two companies, given the new standards, the CAFE-related R&D projects have a measured 
negative net present value, but the companies nonetheless do the R&D to be able to meet the new 
standards.27  
Table 6 shows the averages for the proportional changes in the metrics for the 
counterfactual case without the new CAFE standards.  In the counterfactual case, the expected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Given the historical record, discussed by White (1971, pp. 228-247; 1982, pp. 11-23), of the automobile 
industry’s response to the initial government concerns about emissions and safety, some observers will be 
skeptical of the industry’s views about the difficulties that must be surmounted to meet the new CAFE 
2025 standards.  However, our R&D investment model, parameterized with what we believe to be the 
honest assessments of industry experts about abstract parameters of the model, supports the view that the 
industry’s concerns are real and not simply self-serving attempts to avoid the challenge of the new 
standards. 






value of innovation is higher by 76.4 percent, R&D investment falls by 8.5% (on average 
although there is more value, less R&D effort is required, and that dominates), the private 
benefit-to-cost ratio increases by 83.3 percent, and the social benefit-to-private-cost ratio 
increases by 39.0 percent.  Although the results show an increase in private and social value 
without the new standards, because the averages are pulled in the opposite direction by the one 
company that has already had success with its CAFE-related R&D efforts, the averages are not 
significantly different from zero.  The social values are lower bounds because they are based on 
just the spillovers of value to the industry’s consumers and to other firms rather than any 
additional social value to those outside the market because of the reduction in fuel consumption 
and any associated reduction in emissions.  Thus, in the cases where a respondent’s answers 
imply that the new CAFE standards are associated with a reduction in social value for the 
consumers and firms in the automotive industry, that is not inconsistent with an increase in social 
value if there is sufficient social value created for those outside the industry because of reducing 
energy dependence and reducing emissions. 
 
Table 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
There are a variety of possible interpretations for the two cases where given the new 
CAFE standards, the CAFE-related research for a company has a measured negative present 
value; we focus on two.28  One interpretation is that there may be negative net present value for a 
company’s current R&D as it develops a program to meet the new standards, or to improve other 
aspects of performance while meeting the standards, or to be ready to assimilate fuel-efficient 
technologies created by others.  The company may hope for a breakthrough in its research helped 
by spillovers from the research of others.  Doing the R&D, even though at the moment it does 
not itself appear to create enough of commercial value, may ultimately help in the assimilation of 
research results from others (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).  The company may also do the 
research, figuring that if a good faith effort is made and the prospects stay dim, it may help 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 A third possibility of course is that the measured negative net present value results because the 
respondent did not correctly describe the relations from R&D effort to relative performance and from 
relative performance to value.  After all, that is one reason why there is an error term in the estimation of 





convince the government to relax the mandate.29  Also, the regulators may not relax the CAFE 
2025 standards, but the research projects, augmented with spillovers that the company can 
assimilate, may well get the desired results, but just at a cost higher than what can be covered 
with sale of the improved products since consumers are not expected to be willing to pay enough 
for them given the relatively low price of gasoline in the U.S.   
A second explanation for the measured negative net present values is that funding 
constraints result in a downward bias in the net present value we measure. If R&D funding is less 
than the optimal amount because of a binding constraint, the estimated slope of the iso-NPV line 
is biased upward and its intercept (indicating the actual NPV) is therefore biased downward.  
Figure 4 illustrates a situation where the measured NPV is negative.  The steepest of the iso-NPV 
lines is the one measured assuming there is no funding constraint, and its intercept with the 
vertical axis indicates the measured negative NPV.  If there is in fact a funding constraint, the 
true iso-NPV lines are the flatter ones.  The unconstrained optimum occurs where the higher of 
these two flatter iso-NPV lines is just tangent to the G(R) function.  The actual NPV at the 
constrained optimum is the intercept of the lower of the two true iso-NPV lines shown. 
  
Figure 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The two cases with negative net present value for actual CAFE-related research are both 
cases where underfunding of the research would be understandable and even likely.  In one case, 
almost all of the company’s sales are outside of the U.S.  Assigning a small portion of the R&D 
budget to developing fuel-efficient technology may be a way to enable assimilation of such 
technology developed by others even though the expectations for the value of their own research 
results are low.30  In the other case, the company’s leadership believes strongly that the new 
CAFE standards are forcing the new technology with the likely result being that consumers will 
not be willing to pay enough to cover its costs.  The company may be doing CAFE-related R&D 
to stay in the game with the underfunded research while waiting to see if the U.S. government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See White (1982, pp. 22-23, pp. 72-77) for historical examples of delays in the dates by which 
automobile regulatory standards were to be met, for discussion of the reasons strict enforcement of 
mandated dates for achieving regulatory standards are not credible, and for discussion of companies doing 
R&D as a part of a good faith effort that could be used to support rescinding a mandated requirement 
when a company tried to meet the requirement but found the challenge too difficult.   





will rescind or delay the new standards and also to be better able to assimilate ideas from the 
R&D of others.31 
For each of the two cases where we observe negative net present value for CAFE-related 
R&D given the new CAFE standards, we can estimate what the actual net present value would 
be if the R&D projects have been funded at less than the optimal level as illustrated in Figure 4. 
To do that, we use the average cost per unit of normalized R&D effort for the other four 
companies as the cost per unit of R&D effort, and then solve for net present value at the chosen 
(underfunded) R&D effort.  We can also find what the fully-funded optimal level of R&D effort 
would be using the estimate of the cost per unit of R&D effort and then solving for the level of 
R&D effort where the marginal value of R&D effort equals its marginal cost.   
The second part of Table 5 shows the R&D evaluation metrics given the interpretation 
that the two cases where net present value appeared to be negative were cases where there was 
indeed a funding constraint.  The two cases of negative net present value are replaced with the 
positive net present value at the current suboptimal level of funding as illustrated in Figure 4.  
For one of the cases, the optimal R&D effort would be 81% more than the actual funding-
constrained effort if in fact the negative NPV measured was the result of a funding constraint.  
The optimal NPV would be 116, while the actual NPV would be 83.0, while the measured NPV 
was -40.7.  If the funding constraint story is the correct explanation, removing the constraint 
would increase NPV by 40%.  For the other case of measured negative NPV, the optimal R&D 
effort would be 73% more than the actual funding-constrained effort—again assuming the 
measured negative NPV resulted from a funding constraint.  The optimal NPV would be 72.4, 
but the actual NPV would be 48.1, and the measured NPV was -46.6.  Assuming there is indeed 
a funding constraint, if it were removed, NPV would increase by 51%.   Assuming those 
constraints, the average for each metric of course increases somewhat as reported in the second 
part of Table 5. 
To show the impact of the CAFE regulations on R&D, we used Table 6 and showed how 
the metrics for R&D evaluation changed in the counterfactual case without the CAFE 2025 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 White (1982, pp. 73-74) observes “. . . the manufacturer may realize that EPA’s and Congress’s notions 
of what are feasible levels of stringency and reasonable dates of achievement are derived at least partly 
from the research done by the industry.  Hence, the manufacturer may well decide to slacken the pace of 






standards.  The changes shown in Table 6 are a good description with or without the assumption 
of funding constraints for the two firms that have negative net present value for their CAFE-
related R&D given the assumption that there are no funding constraints.  Assuming funding 
constraints, results for the Table 6 metrics are essentially the same since only two firms are 
affected by the alternative funding-constraint analysis.  One of those reports no changes in the 
counterfactual case, and for the other the changes for effort and value reported remain the same 
with or without a funding constraint and the metrics have numerators and denominators that 
move in the same direction when the changes in the counterfactual case without the new CAFE 
mandates occur.  
To see if the funding-constraint interpretation affects the metrics of Table 6, we 
considered two possibilities for funding in the counterfactual case.  For one possibility, we 
assumed that if the new CAFE mandates were rescinded, the one company (for which the Table 
6 metrics would change) would continue at the same constrained level of R&D effort.  For the 
other possibility we assumed that if the new CAFE mandates are removed, instead of staying at 
the same R&D effort the company would fully fund the R&D.  That assumption fits with our 
sense of what the company would do given our discussions with its president/CEO and with its 
chief economist.  Both think the fuel-efficiency enhancing research would be many times more 
valuable and take substantially less effort in the absence of the new CAFE standards.  So in 
addition to re-computing the company’s Table 6 metrics under the assumption that the funding 
constraint would not be lifted in the counterfactual case, we also recompute the metrics assuming 
it would fully fund the research without the mandates.  Under either set of assumptions, the 
metrics in Table 6 change very little for the one company where there would be changes; thus, 
the findings in Table 6 would change very little. 
In the counterfactual case without the new CAFE standards, if the company chooses to 
fully fund the fuel efficiency research that would emerge in the counterfactual case, it would 
choose to increase R&D effort from what it actually is with the new CAFE standards.  However, 
this increase would still be less than that needed to fully fund the research in the actual case with 
the new standards.  The reason fully funding the research in the counterfactual case increases 
R&D less than the difference between the optimal funding and the constrained funding with the 
new standards is that in the company’s view without the new regulatory standards and the 





relative performance.32  Thus, even though the company’s leadership believes the research would 
have much more value if the company were free to respond to consumers’ demands for new 
technology and hence the consumers would be willing to pay for it, combining the two effects 
results in a smaller increase in R&D effort at the counterfactual optimum than the increase to the 
fully-funded level in the actual case with the new regulatory standards.  
In sum, since the one company for which the Table 6 metrics would change shows very 
little change, the averages shown in Table 6 change very little if the funding constraint 
interpretation is used.  Thus, the story that emerges from Table 6 about the impact of the new 
CAFE standards on automotive R&D activity and performance is also unchanged.  Table 7 
shows how the Table 6 metrics change for the one company with different metrics if the funding 
constraint interpretation is used.  
 
Table 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
We have circumstances where companies find that the new direction for technology (that 
the government acting on behalf of society wants) is one for which the customers of the product 
do not want to pay.  Crandall et al. (1986, pp. 5-6) describe the economic problem that underlies 
the use of regulatory standards to achieve results that the market would not produce.  The 
problem is that “a very tight ‘technology forcing’ schedule of regulations” would result in “high 
priced problem cars that consumers reject,” and older vehicles that create the negative 
externalities would be used even longer.  It is therefore especially important to consider adding 
to the R&D mix the use of public/private partnerships to develop the new technology.33 
Just such a partnership is exemplified by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) 
collaborative project for developing new processes to provide cost-effective light-weight 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 White (1982, p. 21) observes that in the 1970s regulatory targets for emissions “were acknowledged by 
all to be beyond the existing technological capabilities of the automobile manufacturers; the targets were 
specifically designed to be ‘technology forcing.’”  The new CAFE 2025 standards are also technology 
forcing. 
33 The market failure argument for government support of “precompetitive generic enabling” technology 
(Scherer, 1999, p. 57) is especially pertinent here where a government regulatory mandate requires R&D 
investments to produce innovations for which consumers may not be willing to pay enough to allow the 
firms to recoup a normal return on their investments.  The policy requiring the R&D investments itself 
creates an “appropriability problem” (Scherer, 1999, pp. 53-59).  Automobile manufacturers cannot 
appropriate the social value of the new fuel-efficient technology because automobile consumers are 





materials for automobiles.  One of our two respondents from ORNL described ORNL’s program 
in carbon-fiber technology as follows: 
Program goal is to develop technologies that will provide lower cost carbon fiber with 
properties required by automotive designers.  Carbon fiber composites can lower 
vehicle weight by 50-67% but are far more expensive than traditional automotive 
materials due primarily to the high cost of the carbon fiber.  The current program 
looks at all technologies affecting the cost of carbon fiber and seeks to reduce the cost 
of each of those elements.   
 
We asked the ORNL-R&D-manager respondents our questions about the probability 
distribution of the research outcomes, the effort to achieve various expected outcomes, and the 
value of those outcomes to the corporate participants.  We also asked about expectations for the 
proportion of the social value that those corporate participants would be expected to capture, 
stating:  
Typically, the corporate participants in the ORNL collaborative effort will not capture 
all of the value of its R&D outcomes. Other companies often benefit by observing the 
technology and applying what they learn to their own R&D efforts. Consumers using 
products embodying the new technology will receive benefits greater than the price 
they pay because competition keeps price below what they would be willing to pay.  
Because the benefit from R&D in part spills over to consumers and other producers 
(and in the case of R&D aimed at improving fuel economy and reducing emissions 
also spills over to others beyond those using the technology, but here we focus on 
consumers and producers that actually use the new technology in their use or 
production of lighter weight automobiles), the value captured by successful 
innovators is likely to be less than the total social value created. 
 
As a rough estimate, what percentage of the total social value (for users—consumers 
and producers—of the technology) of ORNL’s R&D outcomes in the carbon-fiber 
project can the corporate participants in the ORNL collaborative effort expect to 
capture? That is, what percentage of the total social value will NOT spill over to 
others? 
 
In contrast to the case studies for the CAFE-related R&D of the companies, for the 
collaborative research project at ORNL, with the private sector working with the government 
laboratory and with government funding, the optimal organizational behavior for the ORNL 
collaborative effort maximizes the net present value for the social value of the research.  Thus, in 
the model of the ORNL R&D project, we divide the corporate participants’ private value 
function by the proportion of social value captured by the corporate participants in the ORNL 





estimate because it reflects the spillovers of R&D value to other firms and to consumers, but it 
does not reflect the additional social value to those outside the automobile market from reduction 
in energy dependence and emissions.34  With the probability distribution for the research 
outcomes and its relation to R&D effort and with the social value function, we can compute the 
present value of the ORNL public/private partnership’s R&D as a function of R&D effort.  
Figure 5 shows that function. 
 
Figure 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The current R&D investment in the ORNL project is normalized at 100;  and we can 
develop an argument for additional public support for the project as follows:  The public/private 
partnership is constrained on the funds available, and our model shows that additional public 
support is needed to maximize the social net present value of the cooperative investment.   
To see why, we first observe that a reasonable estimate of the cost per unit of R&D effort 
for the ORNL project would be the average unit R&D effort cost for our respondents, namely 
0.867—the average of the w estimated for each of the six companies providing the case studies 
summarized in Tables 5 and 6.  Then to maximize the social net present value, R&D effort will 
increase until the slope of the social present value curve shown in Figure 5 is 0.867.  At the 
current level of effort, the slope is greater than 0.867, so more R&D resources should be devoted 
to the project, but the allocation of public funds to such a project is subject to the political 
process that is not using the maximization of social net present value as the criterion for 
determining the funding.  The optimal amount of funding is such that )(' RG social  is 0.867.  As 
seen in Figure 5, rather than being the current level of R&D effort, normalized at 100, the 
socially optimal amount of R&D investment is for R&D effort R of 161 which is an R&D 
investment of wR equaling about 140.35   
The model supports the belief that public funding should be used to increase the R&D 
investment in the ORNL project by at least 61% (since the social value estimate is a conservative 
lower bound).  The lower-bound social benefit-to-cost ratio with optimal funding is about 5.2.  
The lower-bound social benefit-to-cost ratio with current funding is about 4.8. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The value to those outside the automobile market is not something about which we would expect our 
respondents to know.  





Many industrial organization economists will believe that we have been too optimistic 
about the benefits of strategic partnerships in the automobile industry.  Our analysis of the 
ORNL collaboration assumes optimal organizational behavior, but it may be that the conflicts 
between the companies and the broader public interest will prove too difficult to overcome.  One 
conflict is the lack of appropriate pollution taxes on fuel for motor vehicles (Scherer, 1996, pp. 
326-327).  Another conflict results because automobiles are status goods, and many consumers 
get utility from having a bigger, more powerful car than their neighbors (Scherer, 1996, p. 326).  
The combination of the first and second conflicts causes automakers to worry that consumers 
will not be willing to pay enough for fuel-efficient automobiles to cover the costs of developing 
new fuel-efficient technologies (Scherer, 1996, p. 328).  Moreover, automakers strategically 
worked around the original CAFE standards by heavily marketing so-called light trucks, 
including SUVs, that had easier CAFE targets and higher margins.  Also, regarding the initial 
efforts to regulate automobile emissions, agreement among industry members was focused on 
avoiding pollution control devices, not implementing them (Scherer, 1996, p. 329; White, 1971, 
p. 231).  Thus, history offers many reasons to believe that we have an overly optimistic view of 
the benefits from the ORNL strategic public/private partnership.   
However, the ORNL project is notably a public/private partnership rather than a private 
cooperative effort as was the mid-1950s Automobile Manufacturers Association’s cooperative 
R&D program to study pollution control devices for automobiles as discussed by White (1971, p. 
231) and Scherer (1996, p. 329).  Physically located at a national laboratory and with R&D 
management from the laboratory and with substantial public funding, the collaborative effort in 
the public/private partnership to develop precompetitive generic enabling technology is much 
more likely to be effective at introducing innovation than was the private trade association effort 
in the insular U.S. auto industry of the mid-1950s.  Yet, given the major conflicts between the 
private companies and the broader public interest in improving fuel efficiency and reducing 
pollution, we must be circumspect and temper our enthusiasm about the strategic partnerships.  It 
is one thing to say we need responsible leadership from industry and government and the 
institutions of civil society; it is quite another thing to actually manage good solutions given all 
of the conflicting incentives. 
	  





The New Evaluation Approach:  Normalizations Enable Interview-based 
Parameterization of the R&D Investment Model.  We have presented a new approach for 
evaluating the impact of standards on R&D investment and its private and social value.  
Although we apply the theory in Scott (2009) and Scott and Scott (2014), this paper breaks new 
theoretical ground.  We have converted the abstract theory into a discussable interview guide by 
introducing two key normalizations: the value of research results that equal the anticipated state 
of the art is normalized at 100, and the firm’s current R&D effort is normalized at 100. These 
normalizations make it possible to discuss with industrial respondents the theoretical, relative 
R&D performance relations.  The two key normalizations are then reconciled in the new applied 
theory, so that after the discussion with a respondent, all the pieces can be assembled into a 
coherent description of how R&D investment is affected by standards of various types.  In 
principle, the approach can be used to analyze the impact on investments and performance of 
many other counterfactual scenarios. In addition, we provide a new method for exploring the 
implications of R&D funding constraints in both private and public settings. 
Importantly, our approach accounts for competition because first we find the basic 
relationships in the model as the firm changes what it is doing given what rivals are doing and 
assuming the firm and its rivals are at their equilibrium, and second we ask the firm how those 
relationships would change in the counterfactual equilibrium given that rivals make the 
adjustments to the new equilibrium. The questions are worded so as to accommodate either 
competitive or Nash non-cooperative equilibrium.   
Ideally, future research will develop large samples of respondents across many different 
industries, different types of research, and different types of firms, apply our methodology to the 
large samples, report the findings, and provide econometric analysis of the large sample findings.  
Creating large samples will be difficult for two reasons.  First, as Mansfield et al. (1977, p. 222) 
explain, companies are often not willing to provide information about their R&D projects 
because the information is considered sensitive proprietary information.  We have addressed that 
concern in part by discussing with our respondents not absolute amounts but instead relative 
amounts.  R&D performance is measured relative to the anticipated state of the art; R&D effort 
is normalized relative to current effort; and the value of R&D results is normalized relative to the 
value of the anticipated state of the art.  There is a second reason that it will be difficult to 





we have learned that respondents find it challenging to answer questions about the functional 
relationships between R&D effort and the relative quality of the R&D results and between 
relative quality and commercial value.36   
We emphasize that once the right individual (or a set of colleagues) in the corporate R&D 
hierarchy has been found, and given that the individual is willing to work with us either in an 
interview or with iterative questions and answers as the respondent completes the survey, 
informed estimates of the relationships can be made.  In the interview or iterative question and 
answer process, we emphasize to the respondents that we would like them to think broadly about 
their estimates of the relations explored—for one example, to get a sense of whether R&D 
performance is expected to increase less than proportionately, proportionately, or more than 
proportionately with R&D effort.  We explain that their opinions about such relationships will be 
helpful as informed approximations based on their actual experience with the types of R&D 
projects being described. 
Standards and Strategic Alliances:  Public/Private Partnerships Enable Standards.  
The ORNL collaborative research project is an obvious case of a public/private partnership, but 
in fact all three types of standards examined in this paper entail public/private partnerships. 
National laboratories typically work closely with industry as new measurement technologies and 
standards are developed, and the process in which industry uses measurement standards traceable 
to a national laboratory requires public/private partnership for the success of the ongoing 
communications between industry and the national laboratory.  SSOs’ standard-setting activities 
entail strategic partnerships among firms and also there is often use of expertise from national 
laboratories as standards are developed and used.  The ORNL project is a collaborative research 
project operated at a national laboratory and bringing together firms from the various parts of the 
automobile industry’s supply chain that will be supported by the research. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 At first look, it may appear that we are asking too much of respondents, who must respond with 
estimates of expected values and probabilities that correspond to a theoretical model.  Undoubtedly the 
questions are more challenging than the sorts of questions often posed in surveys.  However, with the 
normalizations, we have developed the abstract theory to make it accessible for discussion with 
appropriate respondents with first-hand knowledge of the R&D investments.  Such respondents can 
indeed formulate answers with some effort.  Often formulating the answers comes only with multiple 
follow-up discussions as the respondents think, based on their experience, about whether the quality of 
R&D outcomes increases proportionately or more or less than proportionately with R&D effort, or 
whether the commercial value of the outcomes increases proportionately or more or less than 





The strategic alliances embodied in the public/private partnerships toward standards 
support technology-based economic growth with policies that range from the passive supportive 
role of measurement standards (such as for the measurement of the wavelength of light in a fiber 
optic system37), through the more active shaping of the direction of technological change with 
product standards (such as a compatibility standard as for USB ports that work with a wide array 
of peripheral devices) to the most active redirection of technological change with regulatory 
standards (such as the CAFE 2025 standards).  The more passive measurement standards are the 
most even-handed in that they do not typically determine the direction of technological change 
but enable that change, whatever direction the market takes.   Such passive measurement 
standards find essentially unanimous support from the participants in the public/private 
partnerships that develop and enable them.  Of course, at times there are disagreements about the 
desirable pace for the advancement of such standards, with times when industry says more rapid 
development of national and international standards would be commercially desirable and then 
other times when industry reports that the national laboratories have developed measurement 
standards beyond the level needed for the current commercial applications.38  But, there is 
general agreement that the measurement standards are needed for effective commerce.39  
In contrast, regulatory standards that actively shape the direction of technological change 
are often met with antipathy toward what is seen as government intrusion in the workings of the 
market.40  Indeed, our respondents on the whole believe that an increase in the gasoline tax 
would be a better way to induce fuel-saving innovations than the new CAFE standards because 
when facing higher gasoline taxes consumers would be more willing to pay for the new 
innovations.  Current U.S. policy takes the approach not of using taxes to raise gasoline prices to 
induce a consumer driven demand for fuel-saving innovations, but rather takes the “technology-
forcing” approach of the new fuel-efficiency standards, which—although developed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Link and Scott (2005).  
38 Examples are provided in Link and Scott (2012, pp. 45-80). 
39 For examples of the general support for measurement standards, as well as the examples where the pace 
of the development of the standards is behind or ahead of the needs of industry, see the case studies in 
Link and Scott (1998, 2011, 2013).  
40 Some observers believe that performance will be better when strategies exhibiting corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) originate from the companies themselves as they respond to the demands of their 
customers.  For an exposition and discussion in the context of the automotive industry of the view that 
CSR strategies developed by companies in response to their customers’ needs will be less costly and have 





cooperation with industry and consumer advocacy groups—seem to be receiving a mixed 
reception at best.  Given that resistance, to keep the relatively low fuel prices while inducing 
innovations for fuel efficiency, strategic partnerships bringing together industry and government 
laboratory resources, such as the cooperative research project at ORNL, are especially important.     
To inform the debate about the conceptual merits of market-driven versus government-
mandated directions for technological change, our approach provides a pragmatic evaluation.  
We evaluate the performance effects of the passive, supportive measurement and product 
standards and also the more active, technology-path-directing regulatory standards to address 
negative externalities.  Pragmatic evaluation can get beyond what could be seen as self-serving 
statements of participants in the regulatory process. 
For both the passive, supportive standards and the more directive, regulatory standards, 
the statements of those affected by the standards can be self-serving.  With the passive, 
supportive standards, companies get something—infrastructure technology support at the 
taxpayers’ expense.  With the regulatory standards, the companies perceive that technology is 
being pushed in the direction of innovations for which consumers may not be willing to pay. 
Industry and many consumers then see a coerced direction for technological change that 
infringes on freedom to choose the path and pace of technological change.  In such 
circumstances, strategic partnerships bringing consumers, industry, and government together are 
critical.  To provide input to support the success of such partnerships, we use our model, 
parameterized using the views of industrial R&D managers, to look pragmatically at what is 
likely to happen as industry responds to the new CAFE standards.   
We have discussed with industry experts the abstract, big-picture parameters of the R&D 
investment process modeled to allow evaluation of equilibrium outcomes in counterfactual 
circumstances of interest.  Our model can encompass and evaluate both the views of those 
believing market driven technological change would be better and those believing government-
directed technological change is needed.  Our approach can explain and address pragmatically 
the economics of the innovation value created with scarce resources and compare the outcomes 
for the various scenarios.  Strongly different perceptions of what is happening are promulgated in 
the political economy discussion, yet the same investment model can evaluate economic 
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APPENDIX   
 
The two lemmas and two theorems that follow establish the validity of the normalizations of the 
mean-index function and value function and the use of 𝑤 to reconcile the two normalizations. 
The assumed functional forms capture the theoretical relationships as simply as possible to 
enable estimation with few observations.  We assume that these simple functional forms can 
offer reasonable descriptions of the relationships between (1) expected quality and research 
expenditure and (2) value and quality when expenditures and value are expressed in dollars.  We 
then show that the normalizations are consonant and describe the same relationships as the actual 
non-normalized relationships (Theorem 1) and remain valid as the functions change to describe 
the counterfactual scenario (Theorem 2). 
 
Lemma 1:  If bxaxV ˆ)log(ˆ)(ˆ +=  is the present dollar value of the relative quality outcome 
indexed by x , then there exists a function (our normalized function) bxaxV += )log()( , with 
)ˆ)100log(ˆ/(ˆ100 baaa +=  and )ˆ)100log(ˆ/(ˆ100 babb += , such that (i) 100)100( =V  and (ii) 
)(ˆ/)(ˆ)(/)( xVxVxVxV ʹ′=ʹ′ for any two index values x  and xʹ′ . 
 
Proof of (i): Let bxaxV += )log()( , with ))ˆ)100log(ˆ/(ˆ100( baaa +=  and
))ˆ)100log(ˆ/(ˆ100( babb += .  Substituting for a andb , factoring out 100, and rationalizing the 
fractions, then 100)100( =V . 
 
Proof of (ii): Again, let bxaxV += )log()( , with ))ˆ)100log(ˆ/(ˆ100( baaa += and
))ˆ)100log(ˆ/(ˆ100( babb += .  In ))log(/())log(())()(( bxabxaxVxV ++ʹ′=ʹ′ , substitute for a and 
b , factor out 100 from the numerator and the denominator and cancel, and rationalize the 
fractions in the numerator and the denominator to have )(ˆ/)(ˆ)(/)( xVxVxVxV ʹ′=ʹ′ . 
  
Corollary: If there exists a function (our normalized function) bxaxV += )log()( , with 
)100log(100 ab −=  so that 100)( =xV when 100=x , and such that )(ˆ/)(ˆ)(/)( xVxVxVxV ʹ′=ʹ′  
when )(ˆ xV ʹ′ and )(ˆ xV are the present dollar values of the relative quality outcomes indexed by 
any xʹ′ and x , then the actual present discounted value as a function of quality is 
bxaxV ˆ)log(ˆ)(ˆ +=  where aVa )100/)100(ˆ(ˆ = and bVb )100/)100(ˆ(ˆ = .  That is because from the 
first lemma, )100(ˆ/ˆ100 Vaa = and )100(ˆ/ˆ100 Vbb = . 
 
Lemma 2:  If dRcRxE ˆ)log(ˆ)(ˆ)( +== µ is the expected value of the relative quality outcome 
index xwhen the present dollar value of research outlays is R , then there exists a function (our 
normalized function) dRcR += )log()(µ , with cc ˆ= and )100log(ˆ)~( cRd −= µ , such that (i) 
)~(ˆ)100( Rµµ = and (ii) )(ˆ))~/(100( RRR ʹ′=ʹ′ µµ .  In words, (i) the expected value of normalized 
relative quality at the normalized current level of R&D effort equals the expected value of the 
non-normalized relative quality at the actual (optimal) level of R&D effort.  And, (ii) the 





of the current (optimal) R&D effort equals the expected value of the non-normalized relative 
quality at that given R&D effort.   
 
Proof:  Let the normalized function be dRcR += )log()(µ , with cc ˆ= and )100log(ˆ)~(ˆ cRd −= µ .  
Then (i) )~(ˆ)100log(ˆ)~(ˆ)100log(ˆ)100( RcRc µµµ =−+= , and 
 (ii) )100log(ˆ)~(ˆ))~/(100log(ˆ))~/(100( cRRRcRR −+ʹ′=ʹ′ µµ  which equals 
)(ˆˆ)log(ˆ)100log(ˆˆ)~log(ˆ)~log(ˆ)log(ˆ)100log(ˆ RdRccdRcRcRcc ʹ′=+ʹ′=−++−ʹ′+ µ  
 
Theorem 1: The normalized and non-normalized relations describe the same equilibrium.  Let 
bxaxV ˆ)log(ˆ)(ˆ += be the present dollar value of the relative quality outcome indexed by x , and 
let dRcRxE ˆ)log(ˆ)(ˆ)( +== µ be the expected value of xwhen the present dollar value of 
research outlays is R.  Suppose also that the probability density function for x is 
))(ˆ;();( RxfRxf µ= —that is, suppose that the density function depends on R through a single 
parameterµ . 
 
 Let )(xV be defined as in Lemma 1, and let )(Rµ be defined as in Lemma 2 with R~  the 
optimal research outlay, so that R~ satisfies the first-order condition 
 
∫ ∫ == 1)/)((ˆ)/ˆ()/)((ˆ)/ˆ( dxddfxVRcdxddfxVdRud µµ   
  
   Then  R  =  100  satisfies  the  analogous  first-­‐order  condition  in  normalized  units  for  
)(xV andR ,  namely  
  
∫ ∫ +=== )ˆ)100log(ˆ/(
~)/)(()/()/)(()/( baRwdxddfxVRcdxddfxVdRd µµµ ,  where  w the  
normalized  unit  cost  of  research  equals  the  ratio  of  the  optimal  R&D  investment  to  the  
value  of  the  expected  state  of  the  art  quality.    That  ratio  equals  w because  from  Lemma  1,  
normalized  value   )(ˆ)ˆ)100log(ˆ/(100()( xVbaxV += ,  and  from  Lemma  2,  normalized  expected  
quality   ))100log(ˆ)(ˆ()log(ˆ)log()( cRRcdRcR −+=+= µµ and  so  at  the  current  (optimal)  
effort   )(ˆ)( RR µµ = ,  that  is,  expected  quality  is  the  same  for  the  normalization  as  it  is  for  the  
actual  function  linking  effort  to  quality.    Thus,  at  the  optimum,  
  
∫∫ += dxRxfxVbadxRxfxV ))(ˆ;()(ˆ))ˆ)100log(ˆ/(100())(;()( µµ ,  and  
  
∫ ∫ =+= wdxddfxVRcbadxddfxVdRd )/)((ˆ)/ˆ))(ˆ)100log(ˆ/(100()/)(()/( µµµ ,  and  since  
100=R and   ∫ = RdxddfxVc
~)/)((ˆˆ µ from  the  first  order  condition  in  non-­‐normalized  units,  






Proof: The two first order conditions describe the same equilibrium.  Starting from the first-
order condition with normalized units, satisfied when 100=R , we work backwards to obtain 
the first-order condition in dollars, satisfied when RR ~= .  Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, 
 
∫ += )ˆ)100log(ˆ/(
~)/)(()100/( baRdxddfxVc µ  
 
⇔ (ĉ /100)(100 / (â log(100)+ b̂)) V̂ (x)(df / dµ∫ )dx = !R / (â log(100)+ b̂)  
 
⇔ ĉ V̂ (x)(df / dµ)dx = !R⇔ (ĉ / !R) V̂ (x)(df / dµ)dx =1∫∫  
  
Theorem 2:  The normalizations remain valid in counterfactual scenarios.  Let )(ˆ xV and )(ˆ Rµ
from Theorem 1 be disturbed such that the value and expectation of x are now described by 
bmxamxVmxV ˆ)log(ˆ)(ˆ)(ˆ +==! and drRcrRRxE ˆ)/log(ˆ)/(ˆ)(ˆ)( +=== µµ! .  In words, 
technology changes so that the value of any given x increases by )1(100 −m percent, and the 
research outlay required to achieve any given x in expectation increases by )1(100 −r percent. 
 Then, in order to accurately reflect this disturbance when working in the normalized units 
as defined in Theorem 1, we have only to redefine )(xV and )(Rµ as follows: 
mbxmaxmVxV +== )log()()(! and drRcrRR +== )/log()/()( µµ! . 
 In particular, the normalized unit cost of research remains )ˆ)100log(ˆ/(~ baRw += . 
 
Proof: In dollars, the first-order condition will be satisfied for R such that 
 
∫∫ == 1)/)((ˆ)/ˆ()/)((ˆ)/ˆ( dxddfxVRcmdxddfxVRc µµ! . 
 
Let us call the optimal research outlay ∫= dxddfxVcmR )/)((ˆˆ$ µ .  In normalized units, the first-
order condition will be satisfied for R such that ∫ +== )ˆ)100log(ˆ/(
~)/)(()/( baRwdxddfxVRc µ!  
∫ +=+⇔ )ˆ)100log(ˆ/(
~)/)((ˆ))ˆ)100log(ˆ/(100)(/ˆ( baRdxddfxVbaRc µ!  
∫ =⇔ RdxddfxVRcm
~)/)((ˆ)/100(ˆ µ . 
Let us call the optimal normalized outlay ∫= dxddfxVRcmR )/)((ˆ)
~/100(ˆ* µ , and notice that 
$)~/100(* RRR = , or RRR ~/100/* $= , showing that the percentage change in the optimal 
research outlay is the same in either dollars or normalized units. 
 



















Figure 1.  The optimal level of R&D effort Ri* is at the point of tangency of the iso-NPV line 





























Figure 2.  The effect of an unfavorable distribution shift on optimal R&D effort and net-present 
value.  

























Figure 3.  The combined distribution-shifting and value-shifting effects of taking away the 
government laboratory’s role in standard-setting. 







































Figure 4.  Measured, actual, and optimal NPV with a funding constraint.  
 














Figure 5.  The social value of research effort for the ORNL public/private partnership: G* = 730, 















Table 1.  Means for Key Metrics for the Research Projects in the Actual Situation, n = 7.* 
Variable                                      Mean             Standard Error 
 
Private Value/Cost,    7.19   3.51 
G*/(wR*)  
    
Private Net Present Value/Cost,  6.31   3.47 
(G* – wR*)/(wR*) 
   
(Total Social Value)/(Private Cost) 28.3   14.0 
*One of the 7 surveys did not have complete usable answers for questions about R&D effort and 
the expected quality of R&D outcomes and about expected value of future profits and the quality 
of the R&D outcomes. In those cases, the average answer from the other surveys was used. We 
report the standard error for each mean—i.e., the estimated standard deviation of the mean—the 
sample standard deviation divided by the square root of the sample size.  Results in Tables 1, 2, 
and 3 vary somewhat from those reported in the earliest version of the SSRN working paper 
(Scott and Scott, 2013) because we have developed the survey responses further, refined the 
method for computing the slope of )(RG , and rather than using the average of the spillover rates 
reported by the respondents, we have preserved each individual respondent’s reported spillover 
rate to reflect the variance in the firms’ ability to protect their intellectual property. 
 











Table 2. Proportional Changes in Metrics for the Counterfactual without Public Lab 
Support, n = 5. 
Variable                                                                Mean      Standard Error 
ΔG*/(G*initial)      – 0.201   0.0898 
Δ(wR*)/(wR*initial)     – 0.0834   0.0702 
Δ(G*/(wR*))/(G*/(wR*))initial   – 0.138   0.0504 
Δ(Vsocial/wR*)/(Vsocial/wR*)initial   – 0.325   0.161 
 








Table 3. Proportional Changes in Metrics for the Counterfactual without SSO and 
Industry Association Support, n = 5.* 
Variable                                                                Mean      Standard Error 
ΔG*/(G*initial)      – 0.470                         0.145 
Δ(wR*)/(wR*initial)     – 0.345   0.171 
Δ(G*/(wR*))/(G*/(wR*))initial   – 0.191   0.0698 
Δ(Vsocial/wR*)/(Vsocial/wR*)initial   – 0.591   0.144 
* For one respondent, the absence of the SSO and industry association support was expected to 
cause such a dramatic deterioration in the firm’s R&D performance that it would no longer be 
profitable and R&D would be abandoned.  In that case, each of the first two metrics is – 1.0, and 
the final two metrics are not defined, so for those metrics, the averages are for just four 
respondents.   
 









Table 4.  The Loss in Quality in the Absence of Support for Standards. 
As a rough estimate, in the counterfactual case without public support for technology standards, the 
expected quality of the state-of-the-art would be ________ percent of the expected state-of-the-
art quality with the public support. 
n  mean  standard error 
5  77.0   7.7 
As a rough estimate, in the counterfactual case without SSOs and industry associations, the expected 
quality of the state-of-the-art would be _______ percent of the expected state-of-the-art quality 
with SSOs and industry associations. 
n  mean  standard error 
5  60.0   6.3 
 
	  








Table 5.  Means for Key Metrics for the Automotive Research Projects in the Actual 
Situation, n = 6.* 
Without funding constraints 
 
Variable                                      Mean             Standard Error 
 
Private Value/Cost,    2.35   0.911 
G*/(wR*)  
    
Private Net Present Value/Cost,  1.35   0.911 
(G* – wR*)/(wR*) 
   
(Total Social Value)/(Private Cost) 21.0   15.3 
 
 
With funding constraints 
 
Variable                                      Mean             Standard Error 
 
Private Value/Cost,    2.88   0.778 
G*/(wR*)  
    
Private Net Present Value/Cost,  1.88   0.778 
(G* – wR*)/(wR*) 
   
(Total Social Value)/(Private Cost) 25.9   15.3 
 
*For one of the six cases three questions were not answered, and the average of the answers for 
those items from the two other firms that did similar research was used.  Social values are 







Table 6. Proportional Changes in Metrics for the Counterfactual without 2025 CAFE 
Standards, n = 6.* 
Variable                                                                Mean      Standard Error 
ΔG*/(G*initial)         0.764  0.773 
Δ(wR*)/(wR*initial)     – 0.085  0.0867 
Δ(G*/(wR*))/(G*/(wR*))initial      0.833  0.730 
Δ(Vsocial/wR*)/(Vsocial/wR*)initial      0.3905  0.368 
* For one of the six cases, three questions were not answered, and the average of the answers for 
those items from the two other firms that did similar research was used.  Changes use estimates 
without funding constraint.  Assuming funding constraints, results are essentially the same as 
explained in the text.  Social value with the new CAFE standards is a conservative lower bound 
as explained in the text. 
 
	  





Table 7.  Alternative Proportional Change Metrics for the Company with Different Metrics 
in the Funding Constraint Interpretation.* 
Variable                  no constraint    constraint before and after   constraint before  
ΔG*/(G*initial)    4.58              4.56                                   4.71 
Δ(wR*)/(wR*initial)   0.02                             0.0                                     0.16  
Δ(G*/(wR*))/(G*/(wR*))initial 4.47                            4.56                                    3.92     
Δ(Vsocial/wR*)/(Vsocial/wR*)initial 2.17                            2.13                                    1.85 
  
*This table shows the Table 6 metrics for the one company for which the metrics would change if the 
funding constraint interpretation is used.  The “no constraint” case is the interpretation underlying Table 6 
where firms are assumed to fully fund their CAFE-related R&D projects.  The numbers reported in the 
“no constraint” column are the same as those that were used for the company in the averages for Table 6.  
The numbers for the “constraint before and after” assume that the firm has a funding constraint and will 
continue to fund the project at the same level in the counterfactual case.  The “constraint before” column 
shows the numbers when there is a funding constraint in the actual case with the new CAFE standards but 
that R&D is fully funded in the counterfactual case without the new standards. 
 
	  
